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INTRODUCTION

Each generation of copyright law memorializes society's Sisyphean attempt
to strike a static balance between the interests of the author and the public
within the context of a dynamic reality. Congress can only craft legislation with
respect to known facts; therefore, every statute encapsulates legislative value
judgments regarding foreseeable situations at the time of enactment. 1 In effect,
laws are snapshots of the policy balances that a legislature strikes while
implementing a solution to a particular factual problem. Unfortunately, the
facts themselves change and the snapshots become more like motion pictures
that feature unforeseen plot twists.
A confluence of factors prompts modifications of copyright law, including
the development of technologies that permit new methods of distribution, the
rising threat of copyright infringement, and the public's evolving need to access
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2011; B.A., Political Science & Philosophy,

Vanderbilt University, 2008. This note has been submitted for the Nathan Burkan Writing
Competition. I am grateful to Professor Patricia Bellia for her assistance, the members of the Journal
of Legislation for their diligent editing, my friends whose late night advice I found indispensable,
and my father Robert Jiang for his unqualified support.
1. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U.
CHI. L. REv. 800, 811 (1983) ("Omniscience is always an unrealistic assumption, and particularly so
when one is dealing with the legislative process.... [A] statute necessarily is drafted in advance of,
and with imperfect appreciation for the problems that will be encountered in, its application.").
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copyrighted works without owner authorization. Since these developments
undermine the fundamental assumptions undergirding the policy balances
struck at any one point in time, copyright law must constantly be renewed in
2
order to keep up with the needs of society.
This note examines the emerging use of internet-based computer software
applications, colloquially termed "cloud computing," and the role that the
cloud paradigm can play in challenging the core premises of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Cloud computing enable users to take
advantage of web-based services to perform tasks normally assigned to the
user's personal computer or other local computing device. 3 Copyright holders
also see an additional benefit of cloud computing -the ability to exert more
precise and continuing control over their digital intellectual property than other
previous technological measures. 4 Moreover, as this note will later show, the
DMCA imbues cloud-protected works with additional legal protection by
proscribing any attempt to circumvent the cloud itself. Through a combination
of technology and law, copyrighted works enjoy a status effectively on par with
real property.
Copyright law was never intended to provide right holders with such
robust protection. While the DMCA's strong safeguards may have once been
justified when copyright holders did not have adequate technological responses
to digital piracy, these same safeguards will impose significant costs on society
as cloud computing continues to gain steam.
Congress must readjust the statutory scheme to better reflect the values
promoted by copyright law. Part I of this note will examine the history of copy
protection and Congress's evolutionary implementation of copyright law.
Specifically, this note addresses the policy choices made in prior technological
eras to illustrate the strong relationship between a limited copyright law and
the promotion of the public's access to intellectual property. In addition, this
section provides a general picture of the current United States copyright regime
and the various complaints that scholars have leveled against it. Next, Part II
elaborates upon the description of cloud computing already given and its effect
on copyright law. Finally, Part III proposes that Congress enact legislation
aimed at forcing cloud service providers to permit fair and other non-infringing
uses as a prophylactic measure to curtail the ability of copyright owners to
control all uses of their works. Congress must restore the vitality of the fair use
doctrine and ensure that non-infringing access to copyrighted content is

2. See Trotter Hardy, Copyright and "New-Use" Technologies, 23 NOVA L. REV. 659, 704 (1999)
("Copyright law seems never to be caught up with technology, with the result that Congress is
under constant pressure to amend the Copyright Act to bring the law up to date with new
developments.").
3. See Geoffrey A. Fowler & Ben Worthen, The Industry Is on a Cloud - Whatever That May Mean,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2009, at Al, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123802623665542725.
html ("Information is stored and processed on computers somewhere else -- "in the clouds" -- and
brought back to your screen.").
4. See Bruce Richardson, Is 2010 Another Great Year for Cloud Stocks?, AMR RESEARCH, JarL 8,
2010, http://www.amrresearch.com/Content/View.aspx?compURI=tcm:7-50085 (commenting on
a report by Piper Jaffray, which suggested that "broader adoption of cloud applications could mean
the end of software piracy").
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possible in a cloudier future.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT LAW

Copy protection laws have adapted to accommodate the needs of society in
each era. Since technological advancement historically meant new opportunities
for copying and dissemination, copyright protection had likewise expanded to
address these new possibilities. Regardless of the time frame, however,
copyright has always been a limited right. Whether by the limitations of
copying technology or the limitations of the copyright law, content creators
have not traditionally been able to impose broad terms of use against the
public. A discussion of copyright's origins and history can illustrate the limited
nature of the right to control copying.
Early Content ProtectionRegimes
Before it was practical to make a substantial profit from copying another's
works, the concept of "copyright" did not exist. Long ago, authors rarely
profited from selling copies of their works and it was understood in the Middle
Ages that:
[T]he owner of a manuscript... possess[ed] the right to grant permission to
copy it, and this was a right that could be exploited, as it was, for example, by
those monasteries that regularly charged a fee for permission to copy one of
their books. Perhaps this practice might be thought to imply a form of
copyright, and yet the bookowner's property was not a right in the text as
such but in the manuscript as a physical object made of ink and parchment.
5
Moreover, the rights of the bookowner had nothing to do with authorship.
While an author may claim ownership of manuscripts as physical objects,
6
the author's claim of control over those manuscripts ceased upon transfer.
Until the development of advanced marketplaces that could fully leverage the
power of the printing press, authors from the era of antiquity through the
eighteenth century instead received compensation from wealthy patrons, such
as the monarchy, the nobility, and the church.7 Because the patronage system
"provided the authors with the needed incentives to engage in the creative
8
process," copyright was not necessary.
The development of the printing press triggered the birth of modern
copyright law.9 The Venetian Republic, followed by other European states, soon
5. MARK ROSE, AuTHoRS AND OWNERS 9 (1993).
6. Id. at 17-18.
7. See id. at 16 ("Before the evolution of the advanced marketplace society .
the major
relations of exchange for authors occurred within a traditional patronage system in which ...
patrons received honor and status in the form of service from their clients and in return provided
both material and immaterial rewards."); Peter K. Yu, Of Monks, Medieval Scribes, and Middlemen,
2006 McH. ST. L. REV.1, 19 (2006).
8. Yu, supra note 7, at 19.
9. Unlike the manual production of text, printing an edition of a book involved a substantial
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issued "privileges" to printers granting "exclusive rights.., to individuals for
10
limited periods of time."
The watershed event for authorial rights would not come about until 1709,
when the English Parliament passed the Statute of Anne - the world's first
copyright law and "An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by vesting the
Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during
the Times therein mentioned." 11 This shift toward providing authors a
lingering right in their work resulted from the attempt by the Stationers'
Company, a printing guild composed of printers and booksellers, 12 to regain
13
the printing monopoly that it once enjoyed under the expired Licensing Act.
The restoration of the guild's powers, however, was not complete: the statute
limited the term of protection to two consecutive fourteen-year periods and
14
recognized that authors could obtain copyrights in their works.
By emphasizing an author's rights, Parliament may have intended for the
author to act as a foil to the Stationers' monopolistic control over literary
property.15 Additionally, copyright's limited duration evinces Parliament's
rejection of the Stationers' arguments that literary property was the same as real
property.16 Even at its inception, copyright law attempted to balance the
powers of the various right holders toward the end of promoting the public's
17
interest in enjoying the fruits of a robust market in intellectual property.
Early United States Copyright Law
The authority of the United States Congress to enact both copyright and
patent laws are Constitutionally linked under Article I, section 8: "The Congress
shall have Power... to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
initial investment of capital both in the selection of materials to be printed and in the machinery of
the printing press itself. ROSE, supra note 5, at 9. This large initial investment, on the other hand,
produced multiple copies that were to be distributed over time. Id. Printers therefore needed
assurances that they could recoup their initial investment in printing presses through a system of
trade regulation. Id.
10. Id. at 10-11.
11. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY 43 (1994).
12. See ROSE, supra note 5, at 4.
13. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, at 42.
14. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, at 43. Under the earlier regimes, the guild's copyrights were
perpetual and only members of the guild could hold copyrights. Id.; see also ROSE, supra note 5, at 4.
15. See ROSE, supra note 5, at 47.
16. Id. The Stationers' Company continued to promote a natural rights theory of literary
property separate from the copyright system provided by the Statute of Anne. After early court
victories, the Stationers would ultimately fail to persuade the House of Lords that there existed a
perpetual common law copyright. Id. at 47-51.
17. Once a believer of the natural rights theory of literary property, Lord Mansfield would
eventually backtrack:
We must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men
of ability, who have employed their time for the service of the community, may not be
deprived of their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labor; the other,
that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be
retarded.
GOLDSTEIN, supranote 11, at 50-51.
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securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." 18 By framing the need for intellectual
property laws in terms of promoting the public good, the clause served as "both
a grant of power and a limitation."' 9 As the Supreme Court confirmed,
enriching the public domain is the objective of intellectual property and
Congress cannot frustrate that end by providing overly muscular protection for
20
right holders.
Drawing inspiration from the Statute of Anne, 21 the First Congress enacted
the Copyright Act of 1790 to provide protection for books, maps, and charts
upon registration. 22 The narrow scope of copyrightable works would
23
eventually expand in response to technological advancement.
With the passage of the Copyright Act of 1909 ("1909 Act"), Congress
brought the mechanical reproduction of musical compositions within the realm
of copyright. 24 Unlike other forms of copyright, however, copyrights in musical
recordings were subjected to a compulsory license: once a copyright owner
authorized a mechanical copy of his musical composition, any other company
could make its own recording of the composition by paying a fixed royalty for
each record it produced. 25 Congress designed this innovation to blunt the fears
of a monopoly on recorded music by the Aeolian Company, a manufacturer of
player pianos that had bought much of the mechanical recording rights from
America's principal music publishers in anticipation to the statute's

18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
19. Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887, 889 (1971). Far from providing legal entitlements analogous to
property rights, ownership of intellectual property came with significant strings attached:
The Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the restraints
imposed by the stated constitutional purpose. Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly
without regard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby.
Moreover, Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to
remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to
materials already available. Innovation, advancement, and things which add to the
sum of the useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system which by
constitutional command must 'promote the Progress of ... the useful Arts.' This is the
standardexpressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored.
Id. (emphasis in original).
20. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("The sole interest of the
United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived
by the public from the labors of authors.... [R]eward to the author or artist serves to induce release
to the public of the products of his creative genius.") (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
21. See Lyman Ray Patterson, The Statute of Anne: Copyright Misconstrued, 3 HARV. J. LEGIs. 223,
223 (1966) ("The Statute of Anne ... served as a model for the first federal copyright act, passed in
1790.").
22. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1831).
23. Due to the introduction of photographic technologies in the mid-1800s, Congress extended
the subject matter of copyrights to include photographic prints and negatives. GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 11, at 58. Although Congress had not explicitly provided that motion pictures could be
copyrighted, later judicial decisions held that the protection of motion pictures was implied when
Congress added photographs to the list of copyrightable subject matter. Id. at 62.
24. Id. at 67.
25. Id.

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 36:395

enactment. 26 Through the 1909 Act, Congress reaffirmed the Constitutional
policy of rewarding authors with a limited monopoly on their works for the
27
ultimate purpose of benefiting the public.
Because the 1909 Act was enacted during an era of rapid technological
advances in communications technologies, however, the statute was "subjected
to frequent ad hoc amendment and unguided judicial interpretation." 28 By the
time Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1976, courts had "stretched the
limits of statutory language in order to make the obsolete 1909 Act
29
serviceable."
Modem United States Copyright Law
After a 15 year effort to revise the 1909 Act, Congress enacted the Copyright
Act of 1976 ("1976 Act") to set the general terms of the current copyright
regime.30 As defined by section 102(a), "works of authorship" now recognized
as copyrightable broadly included literary, musical, dramatic, and graphic
works, as well as motion pictures and sound recordings. 3 1 Moreover, federal
copyrights attach to any original works of authorship from the moment they
are "fixed in any tangible medium of expression," whether in published or
unpublished form. 32 Section 302 also extended the term of a copyright to
include the life of an author plus fifty years and set the term of all other works
33
to seventy-five years after publication.
Most of the 1976 Act's substantive language was the product of extensive
bargaining and negotiation among parties with interests in copyrights. 34 Many
negotiated compromises were adopted verbatim into the 1976 Act, including
the portions governing cable television, library photocopying, and jukebox
operation. 35 As the Register of Copyrights remarked at an early stage of the
statute's formation, many provisions were "carefully worked-out compromises
which, while not especially welcome to either side on a particular issue, have
36
proved a satisfactory way of balancing the interests."
Congress also codified a number of longstanding judicial doctrines that
limited both the scope of copyrightable subject matter and the types of uses that
constituted infringement. First, section 102(b)'s recognized the idea-expression
26. Id. at 65-67.
27. W. Russell Taber, Copyright Dija Vu: A New Definition of "Publication" Under the Copyright
Act of 1909, 58 VAND. L. REV. 857, 861 (2005).
28. ROBERT A. GORMAN, FED. JUDICIAL CIR., COPYRIGHT LAW 2 (2nd ed. 2006).
29. Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 858
(1987).
30. GORMAN, supra note 28, at 3.
31. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
32. Id.; see also GORMAN, supra note 28, at 3.
33. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1982).
34. Litman, supranote 29, at 861.
35. Id. at 869.
36. Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 1006 Before Subcomm. On Patents, Trademarks and
Copyrights of the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary,89th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1965); Litman, supra note 29,
at 873; see also 122 CONG. REc. 31,982 (1976) (Congressman Railsback describing the bill as a
"compromise of compromises").
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dichotomy, which prevented people from claiming copyright protection in an
"idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery." 37 Section 109(a) adopted the first sale doctrine, which allowed
38
lawful owners of copied works to sell or otherwise dispose of their copies.
Last, and perhaps the most enigmatic, is section 107's fair use exception to
copyright infringement. Under the 1976 Act, "the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords..., for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching ..., scholarship,
or research is not an infringement of copyright." 39 Courts determining whether
a particular use of a copyrighted work is fair are directed to consider four
factors: (1) the purpose and character of the use, (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work, (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and (4) the effect of the use upon
40
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
By incorporating these doctrines, Congress intended to provide the 1976
Act with flexible limitations to balance the statute's expansive rights and broad
subject matter.41 As with the other provisions of the 1976 Act, the inclusion of
these doctrines was also the product of compromise and interest balancing.
When an early version of the copyright revision bill omitted any mention of an
idea-expression distinction, representatives of educational organizations voiced
their concerns and proposed a broad restatement of the idea-expression
dichotomy. 42 After publishers and authors opposed, the Senate Subcommittee
eventually drafted a narrowly worded provision that would later become
section 102(b).43 The inclusion of the first sale doctrine was also heavily debated
between copyright holders, who wanted an explicit rental right that would
effectively override the first sale doctrine, and the Copyright office, which
37. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982); see Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105 (1879) ("The description of the
art in a book, though entitled to the benefit of copyright, lays no foundation for an exclusive claim
to the art itself. The object of the one is explanation; the object of the other is use. The former may be
secured by copyright. The latter can only be secured, if it can be secured at all, by letters-patent.").
Although Baker preceded the Copyright Act of 1909, that statute did not include any provision
describing the kinds of subject matter that could not be copyrighted. Stacey H. King, Are We Ready
to Answer the Question?:Baker v. Selden, the Post-FeistEra, and DatabaseProtections, 41 IDEA 65, 81
(2001).
38. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1982) ("[T]he owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made
under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord."). This
doctrine was established by the Supreme Court in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908)
(holding that copyright does not secure to the owner "the right, after a sale of the book to a
purchaser, to restrict future sales of the book at retail, to the right to sell it at a certain price per
copy").
39. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
40. Id. Judge Story's opinion in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.Cas. 342 (C.C. Mass. 1841) was probably the
first articulation of the fair use concept. See GORMAN, supra note 28, at 139. In that case, Judge Story
held that the use of a copyrighted work may be fair if not "so much is taken, that the value of the
original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original author are substantially to an injurious
extent appropriated by another" and depended upon a consideration of "nature and objects of the
selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may
prejudice the sale." Folsom, 9 F.Cas. at 348.
41. Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislationand TechnologicalChange, 68 OR. L. REV. 275, 342 (1989).
42. Id. at 335.
43. Id.
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initially called for a very robust first sale right.4 4 Congress ultimately adopted a
45
broad display right, but subjected that right to a limited first sale doctrine.
The process of codifying of the fair use doctrine best exemplified
Congress's commitment to obtaining a balanced statute through bargaining by
affected parties. Already a controversial judicial doctrine, efforts to draft a fixed
definition of fair use inspired further controversy due to disagreement about
the scope of fair use under then-existing law. 46 As a result, the "wording of the
fair use provision, and the language of the committee reports accompanying it,
emerged from a hard fought compromise involving protracted, down-to-thewire negotiations among representatives of authors, composers, publishers,
music publishers, and educational institutions." 4 7 While the parties finally
agreed on the language of the fair use exemption, they failed to agree on what
48
the language meant.
Although this system of brokered compromises established a balanced
copyright law at the time of the 1976 Act's enactment, the negotiation process
suffered from a major flaw -Congress could not to bring users and producers
of future communications technology to the bargaining table. Going forward,
these unrepresented parties face the most uncertainty about their rights. This
omission constitutes a slight flaw that becomes more glaring with every
technological advance. In contrast, authors, musicians, and other content
49
producers enjoy copyrights regardless of the transmission medium.
Even if Congress could have fathomed the implications of some future
technologies, it seemed content to allow courts to use their "equitable rule of
reason" and apply the 1976 Act accordingly. 50 Aside from section 108's
limitations on the extent to which libraries could make photocopies, 51 Congress
did not address whether individuals who used new technologies to make
private copies of copyrighted works violated the 1976 Act.52 Indeed, copyright
law has traditionally been about public places and commercial interests: public
rather than private performances infringe copyright, noncommercial rather
than commercial uses are more likely to be fair uses, and a prima facie claim of
infringement requires that the copyright owner show economic harm.53 The
issue of private copying threatened to shift the traditional paradigm of

44. Id. at 338-39.
45. Id. at 339.
46. Litman, supranote 29, at 875-76.
47. Id. at 869.
48. Id. at 877.
49. See id. at 883 ("All uses not expressly exempted remained within the control of the
copyright owner. The bill, therefore, solved the problem of defining the rights in uses made possible
through future technology by reserving those rights to the copyright owner.").
50. Id. at 898.
51. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1982).
52. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, at 132 ("The silence of Congress on the issue of private copies
has left a black hole in the center of American copyright legislation."). The legislative history is also
equivocal on this point. While House and Senate reports hinted that tape recording from a
broadcast would not automatically qualify as fair use, a dialogue on the House floor between
Congressman Abraham Kazen, Jr. and the chair of the House Intellectual Property subcommittee
Robert Kastenmeier suggests the opposite. Id.
53. Id. at 131.
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copyright law. Consequently, Congress was extremely reluctant to introduce
new provisions dealing with technological advancements, like whether home
recordings using the recently introduced home videocassette recorders
constituted infringement, for fear of undermining the fragile compromises
54
already in place.
As one of only two general limiting principles to the 1976 Act,55 courts have
resolved many cases, including questions about private copying, 56 under the
fair use doctrine. 57 Judicial development of the fair use doctrine would
eventually recognize two different categories of fair uses: those that were
"transformative" of copyrighted source material and those that involved the
use of new technologies of copying and dissemination. 58 While more
transformative uses are more likely found to be fair, the use of new technology
to efficiently duplicate copyrighted works is fair when the rights of a copyright
owner is outweighed by the "public interest in increasingly inexpensive access
and the resulting intellectual enrichment that the new technologies can
afford." 59 Using the 1976 Act's fair use factors, courts have found that "timeshifting," 60 decompiling code for the.purposes of reverse engineering, 61 and
thumbnailing pictures 62 constitute fair uses. In contrast, the creation of course
packs for educational purposes, 63 peer-to-peer file sharing, 64 and "placeshifting" 65 constitute copyright infringement.
Current Supreme Court doctrine recognizes a constitutional basis for the
1976 Act's limitations on the scope of copyrights. In Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, the Supreme Court recognized that "copyright's
idea/expression dichotomy strike[s] a definitional balance between the First
Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts
while still protecting an author's expression." 66 Since the 1976 Act already
internalized First Amendment concerns, the Court rejected the defendant's
argument that the First Amendment limited the scope of copyright law. 67 The

54. Id. at 143-44.
55. Litman, supra note 29, at 886. The other general limiting principle is the idea-expression
dichotomy. Id.
56. The Supreme Court eventually addressed the issue of home recordings in Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454 (1984), and held that private videotape
recording of copyrighted material for the purposes of non-commercial time-shifting was a fair use.
57. See Stanford Copyright & Fair Use - Summaries of Fair Use Cases, http://fairuse.stanford.
edu/Copyrightand Fair Use Overview/chapter9/9-c.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) (listing and
summarizing a number of cases that have determined whether certain uses are fair).
58. See GORMAN, supra note 28, at 148.
59. Id. at 151.
60. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. 417,454-55 (1984).
61. Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1992).
62. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 944 (9th Cir. 2002).
63. Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1547 (S.D.N.Y. 1991);
Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1392 (6th Cir. 1996) (en
banc).
64. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001).
65. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349,352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
66. 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) (internal citation and quotation omitted).
67. Id. at 560.
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Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft also recognized that the fair use exception
supports First Amendment values by "afford[ing] considerable latitude for
68
scholarship and comment, and even for parody."
By relying on both the idea-expression dichotomy and fair use to overcome
First Amendment concerns, the implication is that "the availability of fair use is
central to the constitutional basis of copyright protection." 69 Even more, the
Supreme Court in Cambpell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. recognized fair use as
"necessary to fulfill copyright's very purpose, '[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts."' 70 The idea-expression dichotomy and the fair use
exception are therefore not just good policies -they are also constitutionally
mandated.
Digital Millennium Copyright Act
Notwithstanding the existing 1976 Act and over twenty years of copyright
doctrine created by judicial accretion, Congress enacted the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act ("DMCA") in 1998 to help combat the rising threat of digital
piracy. 71 Under the DMCA, the circumvention of a "technological measure that
effectively controls access to a work protected" by copyright and the trafficking
of any device that generally circumvented such a technological access control
was prohibited. 72 In addition, the DMCA proscribed the trafficking of any
device that circumvented a "technological measure that effectively protects a
73
right of a copyright owner."
The DMCA's protection of "technological measures," which have variously
been called a "technological protection measure" ("TPM") or "digital rights
management" ("DRM"), was prompted by two sources. First, the World
Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty ("WCT") required that
member nations "provide adequate legal protection and effective legal
remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures." 74 The
WCT, however, left the precise means of protecting TPMs up to the member
nations.
The substance of the DMCA's provisions traces its origins to a report by the

In view of the First Amendment protections already embodied in the Copyright Act's
distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and
the latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use, we see no
warrant for expanding the doctrine of fair use to create what amounts to a public figure
exception to copyright.
Id.
68. 537 U.S. 186,220 (2003) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
69. Stephen M. McJohn, Eldred's Aftermath: Tradition, the Copyright Clause, and the
Constitutionalizationof FairUse, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 95, 130 (2003).
70. 510 U.S. 569,575 (1994).
71. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0 173-74 (2006).
72. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)-(2) (2006).
73. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (2006).
74. World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty art. 11, Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO
Doc. CRNR/DC/94, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs-wo33.html#
P87_12240.
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Clinton administration on Intellectual Property and the National Information
Infrastructure (the "White Paper"). 75 The White Paper anticipated that
copyright owners would use TPMs for digital media products or services and
recommended the ban of circumvention technologies that would bypass the
TPMs.76 Insofar as circumvention tools were necessary to engage in fair and
7
7 the proposed ban
other non-infringing uses of content guarded by TPMs,
78
law.
seemed to be at odds with the ends of copyright
Nevertheless, the White Paper was dismissive about the effects of anti79
circumvention rules on the public domain and the doctrine of fair use.
Copyright owners also favored a broad ban because they feared that exempting
circumvention technologies for the ostensible purpose of enabling fair uses was
80
too likely to enable massive infringements.
Congress followed some of the recommendations of the White Paper when
enacting the DMCA. 81 The legislative history indicates that Congress was very
concerned about the risk of piracy on a massive scale and thought that the
82
implementation of anti-circumvention rules was an appropriate response.
Given the speed with which new digital technologies could be used to both
reproduce and transmit near-perfect copies of digital media, Congress
apparently concluded that it was important to support the efforts of copyright
owners by preventing infringement at the outset rather than merely allowing
right holders to seek judicial relief.83 Congress largely disregarded the
objections of public interest groups, both because of their weaker lobbying clout
and because of the speculative nature of their fears in light of the primitive state
84
of TPMs at that time.
Congress, however, did carve out a few exceptions to the general anticircumvention rules to protect fair use. First, the DMCA did not regulate the
circumvention of rights controls, which could theoretically allow a user to
bypass a TPM that prevented unauthorized copying rather than unauthorized
access.85 In addition, section 1201(d) created three specific public interest
exceptions allowing libraries, archives, and educational institutions to bypass
A Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable PublicInterest Uses
75. Jerome H. Reichman et al.,
of Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 981, 988, 995 (2007).
76. Reichman et al., supra note 75, at 995.
77. Broadly defined, the concept of non-infringing uses includes "recording works that are not
protected by copyright, recording works that have entered the public domain, recording with
permission of the copyright owner, and, of course, any recording that qualifies as fair use." Sony
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,492 n.43 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
78. Reichman et al., supranote 75, at 996,1004.
79. Id. at 995.
80. Id. at 1003.
81. See LESSIG, supra note 71, at 174 ("Congress followed the recommendations of the 1995
White Paper in some respects. The most important was the enactment of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act in 1998.").
82. See S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 8 (1998) ("Due to the ease with which digital works can be copied
and distributed worldwide virtually instantaneously, copyright owners will hesitate to make their
works readily available on the Internet without reasonable assurance that they will be protected
against massive piracy.").
83. GORMAN, supra note 28, at 181.
84. Reichman et al., supra note 75, at 1004.
85. Id.
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TPMs in order to make a "good faith determination of whether to acquire a
copy of that work" for otherwise legal uses.86 Congress also authorized the
Librarian of Congress to examine "the impact that the prohibition on the
circumvention of technical measures applied to copyrighted works has on
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research" and to
create new exceptions from the ban on circumvention to enable public interest
uses of copyrighted works when users show that they "are, or are likely to
be... adversely affected" by the use of TPMs. 87 Most generally, section
1201(c)(1) states that "[n]othing in this section shall affect rights, remedies,
limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this
88
title."
Criticismsof the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
Since its enactment in 1998, critics argue that these exceptions to the DMCA
constitute token protections of fair and other non-infringing uses. Courts have
already recognized that the DMCA also prohibits circumvention for the
purpose of making a fair use because users always have the ability to create
analog copies. 89 While section 1201(c)(1) purports to preserve fair use, it does
not act as a defense against circumvention in the same way that fair use is a
defense against copyright infringement.
Even more, through the use of technology and law, copyright owners can
effectively prevent bona fide non-infringing users from making fair uses of
content protected by access control TPMs. 90 If an access control TPM blocks a
user from making fair use of the underlying content, and the DMCA prohibits
the circumvention of that TPM, then that user cannot make a fair use of the
underlying work without being subject to a prima facie violation of the DMCA.
In this way, copyright owners "arguably gain the power to opt out of those
parts of the copyright system they dislike," such as compulsory acquiescence to
91
fair use.

86. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d) (2006).
87. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2006).
88. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (c)(1) (2006).
89. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 459 (2nd Cir. 2001) ("Fair use has
never been held to be a guarantee of access to copyrighted material in order to copy it by the fair
user's preferred technique or in the format of the original."). Regarding the creation of analog
copies as an exception to the DMCA itself, the court states:
[Trhe DMCA does not impose even an arguable limitation on the opportunity to make
a variety of traditional fair uses of DVD movies, such as commenting on their content,
quoting excerpts from their screenplays, and even recording portions of the video
images and sounds on film or tape by pointing a camera, a camcorder, or a microphone
at a monitor as it displays the DVD movie.
Id.; see also U.S. v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2002) ("It may be that from a
technological perspective, the fair user may find it more difficult to do so-quoting may have to
occur the old fashioned way, by hand or by re-typing, rather than by 'cutting and pasting' from
existing digital media. Nevertheless, the fair use is still available.").
90. Reichman et al., supra note 75, at 1023.
91. Id.

2010]

Rain or Shine

It is not an answer to say that users may circumvent TPMs that do not
control access. If copyright owners wish to wield greater control over their
intellectual property, then they have a strong incentive to use and develop
access controls rather than copy controls. Furthermore, although the Librarian
of Congress has the discretion to exempt circumvention, scholars suggest that it
has been unable to handle the monumental task of evaluating legitimate
92
instances of circumvention at the necessary pace.
Even if copyright owners want their TPMs to recognize fair uses, the nature
of TPM software makes implementing a fair use backdoor difficult. While TPMs
operate under inflexible rules by "stat[ing] precise conditions under which
certain uses of the media will or will not be allowed," fair use is a standardsdriven concept that is not easily reducible to hard rules that can then be pre93
programmed into a TPM.
Not everyone believes the potential demise of the fair use exception should
be prevented. Some scholars understand fair use as an antiquated response to
market failures that occur when the transaction costs from obtaining permission
94
from the copyright owner exceeds the benefits of the socially beneficial use.
Since the market cannot effectuate such transactions, society errs on the side of
free usage of copyrighted material.95 TPMs, however, lower transaction costs by
allowing copyright owners to offer and charge for access to their works under a
variety of different conditions. 96 Insofar as technology such as TPMs can deal
with this problem by lowering transaction costs, the doctrine of fair use should
97
be reduced in scope.
The use of TPMs to offer different levels of access to content is certainly
advantageous for the copyright owner, who no longer has to worry about the
uncertainty and expense of litigating fair use claims. Consumers would also
benefit because they can develop precise expectations about what uses are and
are not allowed and determine if such uses are worth the price.98 Uses that truly
92. See id. at 1008.
93. James Grimmelman, Note, Regulation by Software, 114 YALE L.J. 1719, 1752-53 (2005) (noting
the argument that "fair use is and ought to be a standard and not a rule because only a standard
will be attuned to individual equities. We should not expect a rule to capture all the subtleties of
human creativity or all the possible uses we might wish to call fair."); see also Timothy K.
Armstrong, Digital Rights Management and the Process of FairUse, 20 HARV. J.L. & TEcH. 49, 53 (2006)
("We cannot have a 'judge on a chip' - an electronic system that balances the statutory factors (and
whatever nonstatutory factors a human judge would consider) and unerringly produces the same
decision that a human judge would render in any individual case.").
94. Tom W. Bell, Fair Use v. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright's
Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REv. 557, 583 (1998). Professor Bell's article was written shortly before
the enactment of the DMCA. He believed, however, that the DMCA's provisions were excessive. See
id. at 593 ("Because [the DMCA] would outlaw methods of squeezing fair use out of ARM-protected
works, it would penalize the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Copyright Act.").
95. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use As Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and its Predecessors,82 COLuM. L. REv. 1600, 1601 (1982) ("[Clourts and Congress have
employed fair use to permit uncompensated transfers that are socially desirable but not capable of
effectuation through the market.").
96. Bell, supra note 94, at 564.
97. Id. at 583-84.
98. See Grimmelman, supra note 93, at 1752 ("[T]o the extent that the allowable uses of media
protected by DRM systems are made clear, consumers can develop precise expectations about what
uses are and are not allowed.").
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are socially beneficial will eventually be offered at appropriate price points
99
because consumers should be willing and able to efficiently pay for them.
The difficulty with this view is that it overestimates the ability of the
copyright owner to anticipate the kinds of uses consumers will want to make of
the work in the future. 100 Given the depth of human creativity and the rapid
advancements in technology enabling even more uses of content, a copyright
owner would have to incur additional transaction costs from constantly making
new access licenses to the same underlying content available. Not only would it
be impractical for the copyright owner to offer a constantly expanding stock of
access licenses to the same underlying content, 10 1 but consumers would likely
be confused by the multiplicity of options. The aforementioned flexibility
limitations of TPMs will also prevent copyright owners from fine-tuning access
licenses based on standards. As a result, copyright owners are likely to make
only a few access licenses available to the market. Finally, the efficiency gains
promised by granting more complete property rights over information are
highly speculative and many economists remain skeptical that such measures
10 2
will lead to a net social benefit.
Aside from these practical issues, there are Constitutional considerations as
well. Because fair use implicates First Amendment concerns, the doctrine's
emasculation may not be acceptable after the Supreme Court's decision in
Eldred.10 3 Furthermore, neither Congress nor the Constitution has ever treated
intellectual property the same as real property. 10 4 Rather, intellectual property
is protected only insofar as protection is necessary to "promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts." 10 5 Even if all copyright owners object to fair use ex
ante, it still does not constitute infringement under the 1976 Act. The
99. Bell, supra note 94, at 590.
100. See Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructurefor Rights Management Systems, 15
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 56 (2001) (expressing doubt regarding the ability of system designers to
"anticipate the range of access privileges that may be appropriate for fair uses to be made of a
particular work").
101. Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: FirstAmendment Constraintson Enclosure of the
Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354,434 (1999).
[A]s Coase taught us, entitlements do matter in the presence of transaction costs. In
individual transactions, the value of the transaction may well be high enough to justify
negotiation costs. But in the context of mass market products, sold with mass market
standard contracts, the costs of negotiating individual variances can be enormous.
Form contracts are developed precisely to avoid these costs. Given high transaction
costs, entitlements will remain where they are originally located.
Id.
102. See LESSIG, supra note 71, at 184 ("Economists have long understood that granting property
rights over information is dangerous... [Tihere is no way to know, in principle, whether increasing
or decreasing the rights granted under intellectual property law will lead to an increase in the
production of intellectual property.").
103. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
104. See LESSIG, supra note 71, at 184 (comparing the Constitution's protection of real property
under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause with the protection of intellectual property and noting
that while Congress must compensate owners if it decided to nationalize all property after a term of
ownership, there is no requirement to compensate owners of intellectual property when it falls into
the public domain after the expiration of a statutory term).
105. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,575 (1994).
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implication is that fair use imparts significant societal benefits beyond that of
saving on transaction costs. 10 6 Conflating the two concepts of "property" by
assisting copyright owners in their efforts to commodify or restrict fair uses
10 7
would be a radical departure from established practice.
A related criticism of the DMCA is that the statute's overly robust
protection of TPMs facilitates copyright owners' attempts to supersede
copyright law with a regime of TPM-enforced contract law. Property, both real
and intellectual, is "protected by the sum of the different protections that law,
norms, the market, and real-space code yield." 10 8 Prior to the advent of TPMs,
copyright owners fought infringement by using the legal remedies provided by
copyright law. 10 9 Going forward, the use of TPMs will increasingly displace
110
copyright law as the primary defense of intellectual property in cyberspace.
Not only can TPMs thwart bona fide fair users from even gaining access to
the underlying content, but the same TPMs can channel would-be noninfringing users to "an electronic gateway, where electronic contracts of
adhesion will condition entry on a waiver of all the users' rights that [they]
might otherwise put forward to justify access to and use of the information
product in question." 111 At this point, users are contractually bound not to
engage in fair or other non-infringing uses. 112 Even if the DMCA permitted
circumvention for non-infringing purposes, it will be difficult to know ex ante
whether circumvention is justified when a prospective non-infringing user
113
cannot see past the access control protecting the underlying work.
Strictly construed, the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions also seem to
apply as long as the TPM controls access to at least one work protected by
copyright. 114 This suggests that a user violates the DMCA by circumventing a
TPM even when gaining access to a non-copyrightable work so long as the
same TPM also protects another copyrighted work. 115
106. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, at 224 ("[Slome of the 1976 Act's exemptions are there, not
because of transaction costs, but because certain uses and users serve socially valuable ends.").
107. Even outside the context of intellectual property, overpropertization on the internet has
been hotly debated by both courts and scholars. See Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (2003)
(finding no liability where a user who sends objectionable content to Intel's employees through
Intel's server in the absence of actual or threatened harm of Intel's server); Patricia L. Bellia,
Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164, 2194-2210 (2004) (arguing that giving a system
owner a right to set the terms of access to an online resource is at least necessary to guard against
economically harmful access and that such cyberproperty rights do not inevitably lead to closed
channels).
108. See LESSIG, supra note 71, at 171.
109. See id. at 172 (illustrating the law's response to technological advances that enabled new
unauthorized uses of copyrighted work previously not covered by copyright law).
110. Id. at 175. While a copyright owner's right was once eroded by technological advances,
modern advances in TPMs enhance a copyright owner's right. Id. at 172,175.
111. Reichman et al., supra note 75, at 1022.
112. Id.
113. See id. ("Insofar as section 1201(c) permits circumvention for privileged purposes, this will
arguably only kick in after lawful access has been gained. Yet, by then, user rights have been
abrogated by contract, and it may already be too late to hack through the electronic fence prohibited
by section 1201.").
114. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d) (2006) ("No person shall circumvent a technological measure that
effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.").
115. While it can be argued that obtaining access to a copyrighted work is a necessary condition
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Scholars worry that a widespread regime where access to works is tightly
116
controlled by TPMs and contracts will erode the default legislative regime.
Under the law of copyrights, Congress balanced the interests at stake in a way
that it thought was optimal for society, even though not every side got what it
wanted. 117 Since contractual provisions can protect works and uses not covered
by copyright, an author that utilizes access control TPMs can bind readers to
118
restrictive licenses that prohibit fair or non-infringing uses.
Assuming that the legislative scheme was already efficient, it would be
inefficient for society to allow private actors to vary legislatively enacted
rules. 119 Prior to TPMs, the proliferation of contracts of adhesion was not as
problematic because ordinary contracts were not self-enforcing. 120 Contractual
terms were always subject to judicial review, which offered the possibility that
a court would refuse to enforce a contract for lack of mutuality, 121 for being
deceptive, 122 or for otherwise being contrary to public policy. Additionally,
there was always the possibility of an efficient breach.
Automated contracts enforced by TPMs, on the other hand, act like an
"infallible 'injunction' controlled completely by one party."123 To the extent that
such TPMs work, they bypass judicial review.1 24 To the extent that such TPMs
are circumvented, the transgressors violate the DMCA. Consequently, contracts
enforced by TPMs can provide even more power to copyright owners than
either copyright or contract law.
When "automated contracts enforced by TPMs" become the dominant
for the violation of the DMCA, but § 1201 seems to protect the technology rather than the
copyrighted work itself. So, although TPM protection is the means by which Congress intended to
enhance the protection of copyrights, a prima facie violation occurs only after an act of
circumvention -not copyright infringement.
116. Margaret Jane Radin, Regulation by Contract, Regulation by Machine, 160 J. OF INSTITUTIONAL
& THEORETICAL ECON. 1, 10 (2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=534042 ("The advent of
[TPMs] has the potential to read out the regulatory contouring of contract just as the advent of
ubiquitous superseding entitlement regimes has the potential to read out the regulatory contouring
of property.").
117. See supra notes 34-36, 42-48 and accompanying text. See also infra note 163 and
accompanying text.
118. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453-55 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a
contractual restriction on the use of intellectual property is not preempted by federal copyright
law); Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1323-26 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that a
shrinkwrap agreement can prevent a purchaser of software from reverse engineering it to view the
source code, even though reverse engineering is a fair use); Christina Bohannan, 67 MD. L. REV. 616,
618 (2008) ("[C]ourts virtually never preempt these contracts [on the basis of federal copyright law],
no matter how much their terms conflict with the [Copyright] Act's provisions. Courts reason that
because contracts contain an element of agreement and bind only those in privity, contract claims
are qualitatively different from copyright claims.").
119. See Radin, supra note 116, at 7-8.
120. LESSIG, supra note 71, at 187-88.
121. See Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding a clickwrap
agreement unenforceable for lack of mutuality because the inconspicuous terms were located on
other web pages and were accessible only through hyperlinks).
122. See People v. Network Assocs., Inc., 758 N.Y.S.2d 466, 470 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (finding a
software licensing agreement to be deceptive).
123. Radin, supranote 116, at 11.
124. See LESSIG, supra note 71, at 188 ("[W]here do we challenge the code? When the software
protects without relying in the end on the state, where can we challenge the nature of the
protection? Where can we demand balance when the code takes it away?").
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model by which access to digital content is obtained, copyright owners can get
a better deal than they could with copyright law. 125 If such a hybrid scheme is
enacted over a large segment of the population, then the Constitutional or
126
statutory rights of those people have effectively been superseded.
It can be argued that the social harm coming from consumers that are
subjected to alternative allocations of rights through contracts of adhesion is
limited due to the possibility that such harmful agreements will be preempted
by legislative action.127 Additionally, copyright owners have an incentive not to
be too restrictive, or else they risk losing potential sales to competitors who
128
offer more expansive use rights.
The assertion that copyright owners will not overprotect their works to the
detriment of both society and their future economic interests, however, is
speculative at best. Copyright owners probably do not care to make their works
available for free in order to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."
As shown by the various lawsuits against parodists, some if not most copyright
owners already abhor the prospect of having their works being the subject of
social commentary or public criticism. Furthermore, as mentioned above, it is
unlikely that the market will provide a way to charge for all or future uses of
content.
Most troubling of all is the past record of copyright owners' attempts to
protect their works against then-novel uses of copyrighted property that later
129
and VHS players. 130
turned out to be beneficial, such as radio broadcasting

125. See id. ("The balance struck by the law was the best that authors could get. But now, code
gives authors a better deal. The question for legal policy is whether this better deal makes public
sense.").
126. Radin, supra note 116, at 6.
127. See Bell, supra note 94, at 608 ("It hardly answers this objection to observe that parties can
bargain away from fair use to agree to alternative allocation of rights- not, at least, so long as
lawmakers stand ready to preempt certain of those agreements.").
128. See id. ("Given the likelihood that fared use will force information providers to compete for
consumers by offering them attractive terms of access, and that decreasing communication costs
will encourage consumer communication and self-help, we should not assume that fared use will
decrease consumers' bargaining power."). Again, Professor Bell's article predates the DMCA. As a
result, the consumer "self-help" he refers to is now a violation of the DMCA's anti-circumvention
provisions.
129. In the early days of radio, the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers
(ASCAP) aggressively pursued claims against those who broadcast their members' music without
licenses. See GOLDSTEIN, supranote 11, at 72. ASCAP then attempted to increase license fees, arguing
that radio performances were cutting into members' record and sheet music sales. Id. at 73. Radio
broadcasters argued that radio play actually boosted sales of sheet music and records by providing
what amounted to free advertising. Id. After an impasse in 1941, ASCAP music went off the air. Id.
at 74. Shortly thereafter, ASCAP members lost revenues from the sale of records and sheet music,
thus validating the broadcasters' claim. Id.
130. The film industry sued to enjoin the sale of videotape players/recorders on the basis of
contributory liability for copyright infringement in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Since then, revenues from VCR usage have proven very lucrative for the
film industry. Dean Marks, senior intellectual property counsel for Time Warner, recalls:
When the video cassette recorder was introduced, the film industry got together and
brought the famous, or infamous, Betamax case thinking that these VCRs were going to
destroy the economic basis of film distribution, particularly theatrical exhibition and
profitable television distribution. What actually happened was just the opposite. With
the introduction of video cassette recorders came the advent of pre-recorded video
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Even when there is profit to be made, copyright owners are reluctant to allow
others to experiment with their works. As a psychological matter, right owners
seem reluctant to make expansive uses of their intellectual property available
and are thus likely to overprotect their works as a group. 131 Given this
historical propensity, the free market for digital content cannot be expected to
make what would otherwise be fair uses of intellectual property available.

II. CLOUDS-FULL STEAM AHEAD
As defined by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, cloud
computing is "a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a
shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers,
storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released
with minimal management effort or service provider interaction." 132 The term
"cloud computing" is a metaphor for an ethereal internet that provides
"anywhere access" to digital content. 133 Under the software-as-a-service
("SaaS") model of cloud computing, a user can obtain the software functionality
1 34
of a personal computer through any web browser connected to a "cloud."
For most people, cloud computing promises a worry-free user
experience. 135 So long as a user can browse the internet, there is no additional
investment required to use a cloud. 136 Because the cloud service provider deals
cassettes. This has become one of the most profitable channels of distribution for the
film industry.
Conference, Digital Technology and Copyright:A Threat or a Promise?,39 IDEA 291, 305 (1999).
131. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, at 224-25 (expressing the expectation that "copyright owners
[will] try to circumvent these copyright exemptions by contract").
132. PETER MELL & TIM GRANCE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, NIST
DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING V15 1 (2009), http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/cloudcomputing/cloud-def-v15.doc [hereinafter NIST DEFINITION].
133. David A. Couillard, Note, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth Amendment Principles ot
Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2205, 2216 (2009). See Fowler &
Worthen, supra note 3 ("Despite its recent surge in popularity, the cloud is among the oldest pieces
of computer jargon .... For decades, engineers drew them in schematic diagrams to show where
their own network joins another whose inner workings are unknown or irrelevant [and symbolized
it] with a cloud, or some amorphous shape .... ") (internal quotations omitted). Cloud computing
should be distinguished from "Web 2.0." CHRISTOPHER BARNATT, CLOUD COMPUTING (2010),
http://www.explainingcomputers.com/cloud.html ("[Tihe key concept of Web 2.0 is making new
forms of online connection between people, services and applications, whilst the key concept of
cloud computing is the detachment of computing resources from any even notional location.").
134. See NIST DEFINITION, supra note 132, at 2 (defining Cloud Software as a Service); JONATHAN
STRICKLAND, HOWSTUFFWORKS, How CLOUD COMPUTING WORKS (2008), http://communication.
howstuffworks.com/cloud-computingl.htm ("In theory, a cloud computing system could include
practically any computer program you can imagine, from data processing to video games.");
Randal C. Picker, Competition and Privacy in Web 2.0 and the Cloud, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY
1, 3 (2008) ("Instead of storing my email on my laptop, I will just outsource storage and store it with
Google. I won't have an email product resident on my computer; instead, Google will provide an
email service through a Web browser.").
135. See Dave Convery, What is Cloud Computing? I Don't Care!!, DAILY HYPERVISOR, Sept. 24,
2009, http://www.dailyhypervisor.com/2009/09/24/what-is-cloud-computing-i-dont-care/
("I
don't care where it is. I don't care about the hardware. I don't care how it got there. I don't care how
it [sic] cooled ....
I DO care that it is there when I need it and is reasonably responsive from
anywhere at any time.").
136. ERIC KNORR & GALEN GRUMAN, WHAT CLOUD COMPUTING REALLY MEANS,
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with all the hardware and software that actually run cloud-based applications,
cloud computing frees the user from maintaining and upgrading the local
computer. 13 7 Storing data on clouds is also considered safer because cloud
138
service providers typically utilize redundant backup systems.
These features have already led to widespread adoption of cloud
computing. A number of public cloud applications are already available for
tasks such as word processing, e-mail, video storage and playback, and data
storage. 139 Businesses are finding pay-per-use cloud models useful due to their
140
instant access, scalable IT resources, and lower cost.
From the perspective of cloud service providers, running applications on
their own systems provides distinct advantages. First, cloud service providers
have control over the content that they make available and can monitor usage
statistics. 141 Cloud providers can also dictate the terms of access (or restriction)
to the content that they choose to make available. These attributes provide
different access plans, such as the pay-per-use model or an ad-supported free
access model. These same attributes make cloud computing very appealing to
copyright owners. Not only does SaaS cloud computing offer a cheaper and
more secure distribution model, the ability to directly tap the buying
preferences of consumers will allow copyright owners to "channel their
investments more precisely to meet these newly articulated patterns of
demand." 142 In this way, the development of cloud content delivery systems
can lead to the kind of market efficiency that motivated legislatures to adopt
(last
http://www.infoworld.com/d/cloud-computing/what-cloud-computing-really-means-031
visited Mar. 2, 2010) ("On the customer side, it means no upfront investment in servers or software
licensing .... "); see Couillard, supra note 133 ("Cloud platforms give users 'anywhere access' to
applications and data stored on the Internet.").
137. BARNATr, supra note 133.
138. STRICKLAND, supra note 134. Recent service outages and data losses have been widely
publicized. See, e.g., Daniel E. Dilger, Microsoft's Danger Sidekick Data Loss Casts Dark on Cloud
Computing, APPLEINSIDER, Oct. 11, 2009, http://www.appleinsider.com/articles/09/10/11/
microsoftsdangersidekick dataloss castsdark on cloudcomputing.html; Ben Treynor, More
on Today's Gmail Issue (Sept. 1, 2009), http://gmailblog.blogspot.com/2009/09/more-on-todaysgmail-issue.html.
139. See, e.g., Google Docs, http://docs.google.com/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2010); Yahoo! Mail,
http://mail.yahoo.com/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2010); YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/ (last
visited Mar. 2, 2010); Amazon 53, http://aws.amazon.com/s3/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2010).
140. Alan Radding, Cloud Computingfor the Mainframe: Will It Ever Cross the Chasm?, MAINFRAME
EXECUTIVE, Sept. 10, 2009, http://www.mainframezone.com/it-management/cloud-computingfor-the-mainframe-will-it-ever-cross-the-chasm.
141. Upon login, a subscriber of Google's webmail service can expect the following treatment:
When you use Gmail, Google's servers automatically record certain information about
your use of Gmail. Similar to other web services, Google records information such as
account activity (including storage usage, number of log-ins), data displayed or clicked
on (including UI elements, ads, links); and other log information (including browser
type, IP-address, date and time of access, cookie ID, and referrer URL).
•.. The Gmail service includes relevant advertising and related links based on the IP
address, content of messages and other information related to your use of Gmail.
Gmail Privacy Notice, http://mail.google.com/mail/help/privacy.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2010).
142. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, at 200. Professor Goldstein anticipated the development of cloud
computing and called it the "celestial jukebox." Id.
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143
copyright laws in the first place.

Even so, a dark cloud looms on the horizon. Although this precise issue has
yet to be addressed in court, a cloud likely constitutes an access control TPM
under DMCA section 1201(a). Since access to the underlying content inside a
cloud can "require[] the application of information, or a process or a treatment,
with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the work," a cloud
144
"effectively controls access to a work."
Like other forms of TPMs, cloud computing can also condition access to
145
underlying content on the acceptance of fair use crippling contractual terms.
Unlike other forms of TPMs, cloud computing can more effectively combat
piracy, provide copyright owners with continuing control over their works, and
can be more acceptable to consumers.
Non-linear interactive applications, such as productivity suites and
videogames, will become much more difficult to pirate because no local copy of
that application will be available. 146 Would-be infringers face the daunting
challenge of breaking into the cloud itself to get to the underlying application.
On the other hand, programmers wishing to look at the source code behind a
cloud-based software application to discern its functional attributes would also
be impeded if the cloud does not permit such uses. Even if breaching a cloud's
security were possible, ordinary non-hacker users would effectively be deterred
from attempting circumvention. Linear media, such as movies or music, remain
susceptible to circumvention through the use of stream capturing technology
147
with minimal loss of quality.
The best countermeasure that clouds offer for both linear and non-linear
media, however, come from their ability to compete with piracy. Whereas other
TPMs that protect locally stored content serve only to limit the functionality of
the user's computer or device, cloud computing offers additional value to the
consumer. Subscribers may find that the benefits of having on-demand access
to an infinite library of remotely stored music outweighs the prospect of storing
pirated content locally.

143. See id. ("[T]he celestial jukebox will bring copyright closer than ever to its historic economic
objects. Since the Statute of Anne, copyright has aimed at subjecting the production of literary and
artistic works to the discipline of market forces.").
144. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2006). Unauthorized access of a cloud may also constitute a violation of
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006). While the CFAA may
arguably be justified by concerns over computer crimes and would be authorized by Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause, the DMCA implicates a different set of Constitutional norms
under the IP clause and the First Amendment.
145. Reichman et al., supra note 75, at 1022 (utilizing the example of a web site that directed users
to agree to a fair use extinguishing contract, which could very well have been the gatekeeper for a
cloud).
146. Matt Martin, Denis Dyack Part Two, GAMESINDUSRY.BIz,,
Dec. 17, 2009,
http://www.gamesindustry.biz/articles/denis-dyack-part-two-interview?page=2
("The
great
thing about cloud computing and non-linear media is you can protect them on the cloud because it
requires two-way input. You can't pirate something you don't have and I think it's the future of our
industry.").
147. Anything that is displayed on a monitor or emitted through speakers can potentially be
copied by video and sound capture devices. See Real Networks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No.
2:99CV02070, 2000 WL 127311, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000) (describing how streamed media
was copied despite safeguards).
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As mentioned before, the SaaS model of cloud computing also enables
content providers to experiment with different business models, such as
providing free advertisement-supported access to content. 148 If the main
advantage of piracy is being able to obtain content for free, then clouds can
allow copyright owners to fight fire with fire and still turn a profit. Advertisers
may also be attracted to the idea that a cloud's enhanced user statistics can
ensure that advertising will not be wasted on an apathetic audience. 149 While
150
some ad-based music streaming sites have thus far have not been successful,
the proliferation of free cloud applications suggests that an advertising model is
still feasible. 151 Given that cloud computing represents a better way for
copyright owners to both market and protect their intellectual property, they
have an enormous incentive to ensure the success of such a distribution model.
To the extent that oppressive terms of use will generally deter consumers
from moving to the cloud, such terms may be limited in scope. This does not
mean that consumers will refuse to use clouds simply because their fair use
rights have been limited. Those that seek to make non-infringing uses of
copyrighted content are likely a very small segment of the overall market. If, for
example, the vast majority of users only care about the right to play back music,
then copyright owners can ignore making other uses of the content available in
favor of overprotecting their intellectual property. 15 2 Even those who were
willing to pay for fair uses are frozen out and may turn to illegal circumvention.
If circumvention is too difficult or the cost of DMCA liability too high, however,
then such people are effectively deterred from making fair uses. This
153
widespread loss of fair use will exact a cost from society.
148. Interview by Danny Sullivan with Eric Schmidt, CEO, Google, at Search Engine Strategies
Conference (Aug. 9, 2006), http://www.google.com/press/podium/ses2006.html (Dr. Schmidt
remarking that "cloud computing and advertising.., go hand-in-hand. There is a new business
model that's funding all of the software innovation to allow people to have platform choice, client
choice, data architectures that are interesting, solutions that are new - and that's being driven by
advertising.").
149. See Google AdWords, What is Contextual Targeting?, http://adwords.google.com/
support/bin/answer.py? answer=91765 (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) ("[Clontextually targeted ads
provide useful information to readers, and attract an audience with an established interest in your
message."). Jack Wanamaker, founder of Wanamaker's department stores, famously remarked "I
know I waste half the money I spend on advertising. The problem is, I don't know which half."
RANDALL

ROTHENBERG,

ADVERTISING

AGE,

THE

ADVERTISING

CENTURY

(1999),

http://adage.com/century/rothenberg.html.
150. MySpace recently purchased imeem, an ad-based music streaming site with backing from
many major record labels, after advertising revenues proved insufficient to cover royalty payments
and operating expenses. Ryan Nakashima, MySpace Buys Imeem Music Site for Under $1 Million, USA
TODAY, Dec. 8, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/techinvestor/corporatenews/2009-12-08myspace-imeemN.htm.
151. See, e.g., Pandora Frequently Asked Questions, http://blog.pandora.com/faq/contents/
63.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) ("Pandora's streaming music service is associated with significant
costs, including music royalties we pay on every song we play. Advertising allows us to cover those
costs while offering you a lot of great music for free.") (emphasis in original). Pandora, which can
be considered a cloud-based radio service, became profitable in the fourth quarter of 2009 and now
projects continued future profitability. Greg Sandoval, Westergren Keeps Promise: Pandora Profitable,
CNET NEWS, Jan. 12, 2010, http:// news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-10433355-261.html.
152. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
153. As Professor Goldstein describes the problem:
[Slome of the 1976 Act's exemptions are there ...because certain uses and users serve
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FAIR USE IN THE FOG

The constitutional validity of modern copyright law depends on the
continued existence of fair and other non-infringing uses. A widespread regime
of extrajudicial TPMs enforcing contractual waivers of fair use threatens the
vitality of these constitutionally-rooted exceptions to copyright protection.
Doing nothing is not a viable option. According to the reasoning of Eldred and
Campbell, the de facto loss of fair use may prompt the Supreme Court to either
find that the DMCA unconstitutionally impinges upon the First Amendment or
recognize a constitutional right to fair use. 154 Moreover, legislative inaction is
precisely what enables copyright owners to overprotect their works. 155 Rather
than allowing the legal rights of copyright owners to rest on a precarious ad hoc
judicial solution, Congress should take the initiative to restore the balance
established by the Copyright Act of 1976. Congress must enact corrective
prophylactic legislation to preserve the public's ability to engage in fair and
156
other non-infringing uses.
The 1976 Act established two axioms: that fair use is not copyright
infringement, and that the judiciary determines what uses are fair. Insofar as
the DMCA impinges upon these axioms by zealously guarding access to
copyrighted work, such measures were arguably necessary in light of the threat
of rampant piracy and the primitive TPMs of 1998. More than a decade later,
the rise of cloud computing and the future development of other powerful
TPMs dampen these piracy-related concerns. 157 Accordingly, the copyright
socially valuable ends. . . If copyright owners try to circumvent these copyright
exemptions by contract-and there is every reason to expect they will-Congress will
have to reconsider the distributional aspects of its copyright agenda and decide
whether to outlaw such contracts or to grant direct cash subsidies to these users.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, at 224-25.
154. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
155. Professor Lessig calls the failure to enact necessary legislation a "libertarian failure":
There is 'market failure' when markets can't be expected to provide goods efficiently;
there's 'government failure' when government can't be expected to solve market
failures efficiently; and there's 'libertarian failure' when the push to do nothing will
produce not no regulation at all, but regulation by the most powerful of special
interests.
LESSIG, supra note 71, at 337-38.
156. The proposed FAIR USE Act does not go far enough. H.R. 1201, 110th Cong. (2007). The
FAIR USE Act merely adds a number of specific exemptions from DMCA 1201(a) and codifies Sony
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) by absolving contributory liability
"if the device is capable of substantial, commercially significant noninfringing use."
157. Trusted computing also promises to usher in a new generation of powerful TPMs through
the use of newly developed hardware components to secure the user's computer system. See LESSIG,
supra note 71, at 178-79; M. Scott Boone, The Past, Present, and Future of Computing and Its Impact on
Digital Rights Management, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 413, 432-33; Chad Woodford, Comment, Trusted
Computing or Big Brother? Putting the Rights Back in Digital Rights Management, 75 U. COLO. L. REV.
253, 281 (2004). Unlike cloud computing, trusted computing focuses on protecting locally stored
content.
As of the time of writing, trusted computing technology is still being demonstrated to
vendors and has not been widely adopted by consumers. See Trusted Computing Group, Trusted
Computing Group to Demonstrate Widely Available Self-Encrypting Drives at Storage Visions 2010
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owner's ability to limit access to his or her works should be limited. A
comprehensive Digital Public Use Restoration Act should therefore include
components that: (A) declare TPM-enforced contractual waivers of fair use
invalid and unenforceable, and (B) create a prospective judicial remedy for
would-be fair users and public interest groups to discover and take advantage
of new or existing non-infringing uses on a cloud.
Declaringthe Primacyof Copyright Over TPM-Enforced Contracts
Intellectual property rights are more limited than rights associated with real
property. 158 Correspondingly, contractual obligations in the context of
copyright should not be as powerful as they are in the context of real property.
If copyright owners are using TPM-enforced contractual waivers to restrict
unauthorized but non-infringing uses, then such waivers must be set aside.
Electronic waivers that are enforced by non-cloud TPMs should also be
included. These other types of TPMs, which have the same detrimental effect on
fair use as cloud TPMs, should not be excused merely because they are less
effective at fighting piracy than cloud TPMs. Additionally, Congress should not
unduly hamper the growth of cloud computing by favoring non-cloud TPMs by
treating such technologies differently.
There is no need to extend this contractual preemption provision to cover
waivers not enforced by TPMs. Under current judicial doctrine, nothing in the
admittedly valid and balanced 1976 Act prohibits such practices. 159 Courts have
consistently refused to construe the 1976 Act's section 301(a) preemption clause
to cover contract that alter the distribution of rights set by the copyright
scheme. 160 In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, the Seventh Circuit states the general
view that "a simple two-party contract is not 'equivalent to any of the exclusive
161
rights within the general scope of copyright' and therefore may be enforced."
Nevertheless, many scholars criticize the ProCD doctrine on normative
grounds. Some argue that the copyright statute reflects a delicate balance
between many different interests that may not be represented in licensing
agreements. 162 As a result, parties who "contract around" this balance affect the
Conference, (Dec. 14, 2009), http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/media-room/news/98. This
note therefore declines to address trusted computing. Insofar as both trusted and cloud computing
allow copyright owners to overprotect their works, however, the concerns are identical. See SETH
SCHOEN,

ELECTRONIC

FRONTIER

FOUNDATION,

TRUSTED

COMPUTING:

PROMISE

AND

RISK,

http://www.eff.org/files/20031001-tc.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2010). Consequently, the responses
to the overprotection of content by either cloud or trusted computing TPMs should also be the
same.
158. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 118.
160. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) ("[A]I1 legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright.., are governed exclusively by this title."); Bohannan,
supra note 118, at 617-18.
161. 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996). This view has been followed by other circuits and is
generally regarded as the leading case on the issue. Bohannan, supra note 118, at 633.
162. Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1278
(1995); see also Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1098 (2003) (describing
intellectual property law as a "balancing act between allowing the greatest number of people to
enjoy works at low cost, without lowering the cost so much that the works will never be created in
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163
rights of third parties and ultimately undermine the legislative balance.
Similarly, those who oppose the "enclosure" or overpropertization of
intellectual property due to doubts about whether increased rights for content
producers actually maximize economic gain are also against allowing
contractual waivers of copying rights. 164 These scholars conclude that the
copyright scheme should always prevail over attempts by contracting parties to
vary their statutory rights, regardless of whether the contracts are enforced by
courts or by TPMs.
A distinction, however, can be made between the kinds of contracts at issue
in ProCD and TPM-enforced contracts. Prior to the advent of TPMs, even if the
purchase and use of a product was made contingent on acceptance of fair use
waivers, transaction costs would likely have discouraged copyright owners
from suing against those making de minimis fair uses. 165 In these
circumstances, suits for contractual breaches were likely to involve actual and
significant economic harm to the copyright owner in a way that made the
satisfaction of the fair use factors unlikely. 166 As a result, restrictive use
agreements not enforced by TPMs are only practically effective against entities
for whom copying would likely not be considered a fair use.
The fear that copyright owners will begin an eternal crusade against all of
their customers for violations of shrinkwrap licenses is overstated, especially in
light of the lessons learned by the Recording Industry Association of
America. 167 Licensing agreements provide content providers with the ability to

the first instance"); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public
Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 42-44 (2003) (noting that while "intellectual property rights
slow down innovation, by putting multiple roadblocks, multiple necessary licenses, in the way of
subsequent innovation," such impediments are necessary to maximize information production
because "information products are often made up of fragments of other information products; your
information output is someone else's information input").
163. Lemley, supra note 162, at 1278; see also Radin, supra note 116, at 9 ("[I1f the solution
envisioned by copyright is now being undermined because all of its rules are treated as default
rules, there is an argument that some of those rules should instead be treated as mandatory.");
Bohannan, supra note 118, at 616 ("Today, people contract away statutory rights -including their
rights to use uncopyrighted public domain material as well as their fair use rights- with a single
click of the mouse. This contract regime threatens to supplant a sizeable portion of the copyright
regime.").
164. Benkler, supra note 101, at 401-08. Professor Benkler understands the ability to create
contractual agreements that expand a copyright owner's legal rights to be a form of enclosure that
leads to suboptimal information distribution. Id. at 431-35.
165. During the oral argument for William & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per
curiam), Chief Justice Burger asked whether an individual who photocopies a protected work
would be liable for infringement. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, at 117-18. Speaking for the plaintiff
copyright holder in the case, Alan Latman responded that "[niobody would sue ... because it's
impractical for anyone to sue." Id. at 118. This answer apparently satisfied Chief Justice Burger, who
remarked that in a damage claim for small-scale copying, "[tihe recovery might be de minimis, so
that no one would have any incentive to sue." Id. at 118-19.
166. For example, in ProCD, the plaintiff ProCD offered its SelectPhone product to the general
public with shrinkwrap provisions for personal use. 86 F.3d at 1449. Zeidenberg copied ProCD's
$10 million database and made it commercially available at a lower price, thus becoming a
significant competitor against ProCD. Id. at 1450. Supposing the underlying content in this case was
actually copyrightable, the defendant Zeidenberg would probably fail to prove fair use under the
section 107 statutory factors. See supra notes 39-40.
167. In an about-face, the RIAA announced that it would abandon its much-criticized strategy of
filing mass lawsuits against individual infringers due to mixed results and the ensuing publicrelations disaster. Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J.,
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exercise price discrimination and can therefore make media maximally
available to the public. 168 Moreover, while parties to a contract need not
consider the interests of anyone else, courts can consider public policy. Simply
put, the costs involved in litigation and the possibility of losing even a
seemingly meritorious claim for the breach of a paper or shrinkwrap license
constitute a real defense for an individual who wishes to make a fair use in
violation of a contractual agreement.
Overprotection of copyrighted works was therefore not a problem until
TPMs made it feasible to passively enforce restrictive use agreements against
massive numbers of purchasers. In this context, the normative criticisms apply
full-force. By preventing judicial review of these contracts, important safety
valves can be ignored to the detriment of society. 169 In these circumstances, it is
doubtful that the benefits of price discrimination outweigh the costs of losing
non-infringing uses by default. 170 Because a Digital Public Use Restoration Act
should protect non-infringing uses to the extent that they can be completely
superseded by TPMs, the scope of contractual preemptions should be limited
only to those enforced by TPMs.
Enactinga Prospective Judicial Remedy
Even in the absence of restrictive use agreements, a copyright owner's TPM
may still prohibit the realization of a desired non-infringing use. Facing the
prospect of violating the DMCA, many may decline to make socially beneficial
uses altogether.
While the DMCA's protection of TPMs is still necessary to defend
copyrighted works from piracy, the TPMs themselves should ideally allow
users to make non-infringing uses of the underlying work. The problem is that
as long as technology continues to make new uses of copyrighted works
possible, it will be impossible to create an exhaustive list of fair uses.
Furthermore, the law does not provide the putative non-infringing user with a
legal remedy should a copyright owner refuse to enable non-infringing access.
As Professors Reichman, Dinwoode, and Samuelson conceived of it, the
reverse notice and takedown process begins with a user or public interest group
demand that the copyright owner disable a TPM for the limited purpose of
making a non-infringing use of the underlying work. 1 71 Copyright owners may
either allow the use or issue a timely rejection. In the case of a rejection, the user
may pursue a declaratory judgment to vindicate the claim to an entitlement to

Dec. 19, 2008, at B1,availableat http://onine.wsj.com/article/SB122966038836021137.htm.
168. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
169. See Radin, supra note 116, at 11 (opposing the use of TPMs because they effectively eliminate
efficient breach, fair use, unconscionability, reliance, reasonable expectation, duress, interests
balancing, and other concepts by allowing content owners to bypass these "safety valve[s]" in
court).
170. See notes 100-02, 162-64 and accompanying text.
171. Reichman et al., supra note 75, at 1032; but see Litman, supra note 29, at 899 ("Relying on
courts to make equitable, fact-specific determinations inevitably involves judicial assessments of the
value of the allegedly infringing works, despite the long copyright tradition hostile to such
assessments in other contexts.").
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circumvent the TPM for the limited purpose of engaging in the non-infringing
use. Thus, the reverse notice and takedown process is the mirror opposite of the
notice and takedown process described in DMCA 512(c) 172 and allows for the
recognition of new fair uses due to advancements in technology and
imagination.
As originally envisioned, the reverse notice and takedown process is
problematic. Since a favorable declaratory judgment merely permits a user to
circumvent the TPM rather than force the copyright owner to enable the noninfringing use, only hackers and entities with enough money to hire hackers
can take advantage of this remedy.1 73 Unsophisticated users would have to rely
on obtaining circumvention tools- tools which should not be available due to
the anti-trafficking provision of the DMCA. 174 Even if these tools were illegally
available, such a remedy would only be feasible if the TPM guarded locally
stored content. The strength of cloud TPMs can make the reverse notice and
takedown process more of a "hacker's right" than it already was. Moreover,
spontaneous uses would disappear altogether under a regime requiring prior
175
judicial determination.
With a few modifications, the original reverse notice and takedown process
can be adapted to better fit the cloud computing paradigm. First, non-infringing
users should be entitled to an injunctive remedy if circumventing the TPM
proves to be difficult. A declaratory judgment giving the user a right to
circumvent is useless if that right cannot be exercised. Unsophisticated users
should not be expected to overcome the firewalls of Troy.
This is certainly the case with respect to a cloud TPM's ability to exert
effective and continuing control over access to non-linear content.176 Absent an
injunction, the prospect of hacking a cloud makes taking advantage of fair use
prohibitively costly for non-linear content. The availability of dual use video
capturing devices may compromise a cloud's ability to absolutely protect linear
media, 177 and therefore putative non-infringing users may have their desired
access to the content without having to get an injunction. The option for
obtaining an injunction should remain open due to possible new technologies
that may effectively protect even linear media from circumvention.

172. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006).
173. See Burk & Cohen, supra note 100, at 61 ("[Uinder this system, fair use might become the
sole provenance of well-capitalized firms with the resources to engage in the process.").
174. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
175. Burk & Cohen, supra note 100, at 61. Professors Burk and Cohen argue that a "key escrow"
system would be a superior alternative to relying on a prospective judicial remedy. Id. at 63. Under
their proposal, trusted third parties are given "keys" that can disable TPMs and are authorized to
distribute these keys to those seeking to make fair uses of the underlying content. Id. To preserve
spontaneous uses, however, they eschew any preauthorization requirement -including making a
determination regarding the bona fides of the access application; instead, the third party would
issue the keys automatically upon request. Id. While this approach does provide fair uses to the
maximum extent possible, it does so by effectively eliminating TPMs. Such a drastic solution does
not seem to adequately take into account the risk of massive piracy that motivated Congress to
adopt the DMCA in the first place.
176. See supra notes 145-147 and accompanying text.
177. Under the FAIR USE Act, H.R. 1201, such dual use hardware devices may be legal and
therefore available.
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Second, claimants should be compensated for reasonable legal fees upon
success. By creating an incentive for attorneys to pursue meritorious fair use
claims, users otherwise lacking financial resources to press their claims in court
can feasibly use the reverse notice and takedown process. A higher volume of
litigation also ensures that new kinds of fair uses will be discovered. Most
importantly, copyright owners and cloud service providers would be forced to
take non-infringing uses seriously. As potential repeat actors in court, they
would be discouraged from overprotecting content due to the increased costs of
litigating additional cases and possibly losing. Ideally, this would encourage
copyright owners to enable as much non-infringing access to their works as is
feasible.
This modified reverse notice and takedown process will not discourage
investment in cloud computing or other sophisticated TPMs. While TPMs that
overprotect may be the subject of additional reverse takedown claims, TPMs
that underprotect content are prone to piracy. If anything, copyright owners
would want to find the middle ground by investing in smarter TPMs that can
better discriminate particular uses.
Compared to earlier TPMs that guarded locally stored content, cloud TPMs
are both smarter and stronger. Due to their control over the underlying work,
cloud TPMs are in a position to grant limited fair use licenses 178 upon
validation of the subscriber's identity or credentials. 179 In contrast, copyright
owners would have to completely disable a less sophisticated TPM to allow for
fair uses without even such assurances that the user will not abuse their access.
A larger concern is whether content producers would want to continue
producing digital media if the use of TPMs means having to deal with reverse
takedown claims or the expense of using sophisticated TPMs that permit access
for fair use. There are two responses to this problem. First, if the costs
associated with making fair uses available outweighs the benefits of having the
TPM, then copyright owners will be forced to sell TPM-free content. Nothing
forces copyright owners to use TPMs, and works unprotected by technological
measures remain protected by copyright law.
To the extent that the risk of infringement is too great to provide TPM-free
content, we must reconsider whether the production of digital intellectual
property actually promotes the useful arts if access to it will always be strictly
controlled. This is, however, a complex question regarding the feasibility,
profitability, and social impact of cloud computing, which will only be
answered as these services become more common. If the enactment of the 1976
Act sheds light on how to create a balanced copyright law, Congress should
consider bringing all relevant groups of copyright owners and public interest

178. Limited access does not necessarily mean that the access has to be convenient. See supra note
89. A cloud service provider may force the user to print the source code of a program rather than
make it available in a text file if this will reduce the risk of piracy. A cloud may also degrade the fair
use version of a music file or add watermarks to videos.
179. Given that automated validation measures are already used to enable online banking and
other important commercial transactions, including subscribing to clouds for access to digital
content, it should be possible for cloud service providers to allow fair use access without requiring
human intervention.
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advocates to the bargaining table in order to manage the costs and benefits of
cloud TPMs.
CONCLUSION

The Constitution directs Congress to create a copyright law only for the
limited purpose of "promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts."
Spurred onward by technological advancements that provided additional
opportunities for others to use copyrighted works in new transmission
mediums, each past iteration of copyright law has progressively expanded the
scope of copyright protection. Nevertheless, past legislatures have crafted
important caveats to copyright in order to prevent the complete
monopolization of access to copyrighted content. 180 Now that technology
allows copyright owners to protect their works more comprehensively than
either copyright or even contract law, it follows that Congress should restrict
the scope of legal protection for copyrighted works.
Cloud computing constitutes both a promise and a threat. By providing
additional security against copyright infringement, clouds can help enforce the
default regime of copyright law. The problem arises when clouds protect
underlying content too effectively, thereby superseding the delicate balances
established by copyright laws with privately created and extrajudicially
enforced terms of use. Under the regime of cloud TPMs, the public may never
be able to engage in unauthorized but non-infringing uses of copyrighted
works.
By prohibiting the circumvention of cloud TPMs, the DMCA is now in
conflict with the Copyright Act of 1976. The ability to charge for fair and other
non-infringing uses does not guarantee that copyright owners will to make
such uses available. In addition, First Amendment concerns remain salient due
to this substantial risk of speech restriction. Congress must therefore resolve the
tension by allowing room for the public to engage in fair and other noninfringing uses of copyrighted works before such uses vaporize.

180. See supra notes 15, 26 and accompanying text.

